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Disturbances in the experience of time have been a commonly reported feature of
depressive disorders since the beginning of modern psychiatry and psychological
research. However, qualitative research approaches to investigate the phenomenon are
rarely used. We employed content analysis to investigate disturbances of time experience
in Major Depressive Disorder. Our analysis from 25 participants showed that individuals
with Major Depressive Disorder subjectively seem to have lost the ability to influence
or change the present, resulting in an impersonal and blocked future. The present
is rendered meaningless, the past unchangeably negative, and the passage of time
turned into a dragging, inexorable, and viscous continuance. The overall,—possibly
intersubjective—concept of time experience, remains largely intact, causing or adding
to depressive mood and suffering. We elaborate on how these findings reflect previous
theories on the experience of time in depression. This study might encourage future
inquiries into both the phenomenal and neuroscientific foundation of time experience
under psychopathological conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
Temporal dysfunctions are a commonly reported feature of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).
A variety of experimental approaches has been employed in order to assess and investigate these
disturbances, with varying conclusions. For instance, research exploring human time perception
has yielded inconsistent results concerning its potential disturbance in MDD (Thönes and
Oberfeld, 2015). One of the more robust results from this line of research is the observation of
a subjective decrease in the experienced velocity of the flow of time in depressive disorders. This
decrease is possibly the most prominent and most often reported disturbance of time experience
in MDD in the literature. It was either obtained from patients’ qualitative descriptions (Lewis,
1932; Hartocollis, 1975; Wyrick and Wyrick, 1977; Kuhs, 1991; Mundt et al., 1998; Bschor et al.,
2004; Stanghellini et al., 2016, 2017) or by making additional use of questionnaires or subjective
quantitative measures (Lehmann, 1967; Bech, 1975; Kitamura and Kumar, 1982; Richter and
Benzenhoefer, 1985; Blewet, 1992).
In this context phenomenological psychopathology offers a unique opportunity.
Structural psychopathology investigating MDD appositely has identified disturbances in
time experience as the basis underlying the disorder and linking its symptoms, ranging
from impairments in neurocognitive and psychomotor functions, over changes in affect
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and mood to depressive delusions (Stanghellini et al., 2017).
The emerging syndrome has adequately been referred to as a
disturbance of lived time (Fuchs, 2001, 2013, 2014; Broome, 2005;
Kupke, 2005; Wyllie, 2005; Gallagher, 2012; Moskalewicz, 2015;
Bloc et al., 2016; Stanghellini et al., 2016), the slowing down
of the subjective experience of time has been conceptualized
to be a part of this syndrome (Wyllie, 2005; Fuchs, 2013,
2014; Stanghellini et al., 2017). The investigation of such an
underlying principle or mechanism is of special significance,
as current insights increasingly emphasize the importance of
recognizing depressive symptoms apart from affect and mood
for both diagnosis, therapy, and prognosis (Gonda et al., 2015).
Despite the wealth of theoretical accounts on time experience,
there has been only limited empirical research on the construct
of lived time (Stanghellini et al., 2016, 2017). To the best of
our knowledge, we present the first prospective empirical study
employing qualitative content analysis as an empirical tool for
phenomenological psychopathology to investigate disturbances
of time experience in MDD. We will compare our results to
those from a recent study on healthy individuals using the same
method (Vogel et al., in revision).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited from patients admitted for in-
patient treatment to the Department of Psychiatry at the
University Hospital Cologne. Patients were considered for
inclusion into this study if the clinical diagnosis of a
Severe Depressive Episode (ICD-10, F32.2) (World Health
Organization, 1992) had been established after admission.
Patients were only considered for inclusion, if they had neither
record of comorbid neurological or comorbid psychiatric disease
nor was there any neurological or psychiatric comorbidity
detectable in the clinical diagnostic procedures. Comorbidities
included organic brain disease, mental retardation (IQ<70),
manic or hypomanic episodes, bipolar disorder, psychosis or
schizophrenia, personality disorders, and addiction. Patients
eligible for inclusion were clinically rescreened approximately
2 weeks after admission by the principal investigators qualified
for making a clinical diagnosis (DHVV, KV) for meeting
both diagnostic criteria for a Severe Depressive Episode
(ICD-10, F32.2) (World Health Organization, 1992) and
diagnostic criteria for non-chronic MDD as defined by the
DSM 5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Patients
were deemed eligible regardless of the number of prior
depressive episodes, however patients diagnosed with chronic
or persistent depressive disorder, or dysthymia were not
considered for inclusion. Patients meeting these inclusion criteria
were provided with the study material (see below). Patient
screening and subsequent study inclusion were conducted
over the course from January 2015 until August 2017. None
of the patients included were taking any neuropsychiatric
or any otherwise psychoactive or illegal drug not explicitly
prescribed for anti-depressive treatment over the period
of investigation. All participants received pharmacological
anti-depressive treatment according to the S3 guidelines by
the German Association for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and
Psychosomatics (Härter et al., 2017) (see Table 1). Two
participants received electro-convulsive-therapy. Participants
were included in a post-acute state, only after acute treatment
interventions (e.g., treatment with benzodiazepines) had been
successfully terminated. All participants underwent additional
cognitive-behavioral therapy in group settings over the period of
investigation.
We administered the Beck-Depression-Inventory (BDI-
II) (Hautzinger et al., 1995) and a verbal IQ measure
(WST) (Schmidt and Metzler, 1992). We used BDI-Scores to
approximate depressive symptom severity and used WST-Scores
to guarantee verbal speech comprehension, proper production
of written material, and sufficient intellectual capability to cope
with the complex subject of time experience. Demographics and
results from BDI-II and WST are presented in Table 2.
The Time Questionnaire
The Time Questionnaire (TQ) (Figure 1) was specifically
designed to address as many aspects of the experience of time
as possible making use of open questions, and it has been
successfully tested in a previous study on the experience of time
in healthy participants (Vogel et al., in revision).
Questions (Q) 1–3 address the flow of time, with Q1
being as broad and open as possible and Q2–3 inquiring
further into the dependency on interpersonal and situational
TABLE 1 | Prescribed daily medication and weekly Electro Convulsive Therapy
(ECT).
D1 Mirtazapine 30mg, Olanzapine 7.5mg, Venlafaxine ret. 150mg
D2 Mirtazapine 30mg, Quetiapine 25mg
D3 Venlafaxine ret. 225mg
D4 Venlafaxine ret. 225mg
D5 Bupropion 300mg, Mirtazapine 15mg
D6 Quetiapine ret. 300mg, Agomelatine 50mg, Tranylcypromine 50mg,
Lithium ret. 675mg, Pregabalin 300mg
D7 Lithium ret. 900mg, Sertraline 150mg
D8 Mirtazapine 30mg
D9 Milnacipran 50mg, Quetiapine 150mg
D10 Mirtazapine 30mg, Agomelatine 25mg
D11 Escitalopram 10mg
D12 Citalopram 20mg, Quetiapine ret. 100mg
D13 ECT, Tranylcypromine 40mg
D14 Duloxetine 90mg
D15 Duloxetine 90mg
D16 Escitalopram 20mg, Mirtazapine 30mg
D17 Venlafaxine ret. 225mg, Bupropion 150mg
D18 Mirtazapine 30mg, Venlafaxine ret. 150mg, Pregabaline 200mg
D19 Venlafaxine ret. 225mg, Quetiapine 25mg
D20 Venlafaxine ret. 225mg
D21 Sertraline 200mg, Trimipramine 75mg
D22 Mirtazapine 30mg
D23 Escitalopram 5mg, Quetiapine ret. 300mg, Lithium ret. 675mg
D24 ECT, Venlafaxine ret. 225mg, Quetiapine 50mg
D25 Mirtazapine 45mg, Aripiprazole 5mg
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context. Q4–7 are designed to address experience, concepts,
and subjective meaning of the past, present, and future.
Additional space is provided for participants to address anything
they found relevant concerning the experience of time, but
could in their opinion not be assigned to a specific question.
Participants were instructed to write as much or as little
as they found sufficient. There were no time limits for
completion.
All returning documents were analyzed using summarizing
content analysis (acc. to Mayring, 2014) (SCA). Superfluous
examples and redundancies were deleted from the material. The
remaining text was paraphrased into common language. The
smallest possible part of the material to be categorized and
coded was defined as a single statement within the material,
ranging from a single word to multiple sentences. The largest
possible part of the material that could form a coded category
was defined as everything addressing one question. From the
paraphrased material individual statements were identified. For
each participant descriptive categories were generated for each
single paraphrased statement. After all paraphrases had been
assigned a category, the material was re-screened, and categories
of similar or identical content were merged. This was repeated
until a coherent categorical system had been established.
To evaluate the final categorical system’s reliability, it was
presented to two independent inter-coders (K.K., T.S.). Inter-
coders were provided with an explication, a coding rule, and
an anchor example and the code for each of the categories,
together with the uncoded paraphrased material (Table 3).
The inter-coders assigned each paraphrased statement to one
category by employing the explication and coding rules. Inter-
coder agreement was calculated by comparing codes from
the coded material from the initial analysis, both inter-coders
using Krippendorff ’s alpha (Krippendorff, 2004; Hayes and
Krippendorff, 2007).
TABLE 2 | Demographics (Standard Deviation in brackets).
Gender m = 15; w = 10
Mean age 47 (±14)
Mean years of education 16 (±3.5)
Mean BDI 19 (±11)
Mean verbal IQ 101 (±8)
RESULTS
We identified 235 statements in total. We identified and
explicated 30 categories which could be assigned to five different
groups roughly corresponding to the initial formulation of
questions. The first group consisted of eleven categories and
addressed the passage of time (87 statements, app. 37% of all
statements, categories K01-11). The second group consisted of
nine categories concerning the present (64 statements, app. 27%
of all statements, categories K12-20). The third group consisted of
four categories and addressed the past (38 statements, app. 16% of
all statements, categories K21-24). The fourth group addressing
the future consisted of six categories (44 statements, app. 19%
of all statements, categories K24-29). The last group was a single
category labeled Rest (2 statements, app. 1% of all statements,
category K30). This group coded for all statements which were
not addressing the experience of time or were too unspecific
or too divergent from the explanations of the other categories.
The categorical system for the analyzed material is depicted
in Table 3. The number of counts per category is depicted in
Figure 2. Calculation of Krippendorff ’s alpha yielded a strong
inter-coder agreement of α= 0.93.
Category Group “Passage of Time”
The majority of categories related to the Passage of Time
concerned experiences of a changed velocity of passing time
(categories 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 10, 11; in total: n = 58 statements,
app. 24% of all statements). Five categories related to changes
in situational or social contexts (categories 01, 02, 03, 04, 05;
in total: n = 36 statements, app. 15% of all statements). Most
categories specified either an acceleration or an increase in the
velocity of the passage of time during activities (category 01,
n = 9 statements, 36% of participants), during engagement
in pleasant situations (category 02, n = 10 statements, 40%
of participants), or during engagement in interaction with
others (category 05, n = 10 statements, 40% of participants).
Fewer participants reported a deceleration or a decrease in
the experienced velocity of the passage of time, namely during
unpleasant situations (category 03, n = 4 statements, 16% of
participants), or during the presence of others (category 04,
n = 3 statements, 12% of participants). Two categories referred
to general changes in the velocity of time irrespective of whether
this experience was related to an activity (categories 10, 11; n= 18
FIGURE 1 | The Time Questionnaire.
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TABLE 3 | The Categorical System.
K01 When active, time passes quickly. “While at work, time passes quickly.”
K02 During pleasant situations/activities time passes quickly. “The better I feel, the faster time passes”
K03 During unpleasant situations/activities time passes slowly. “In an unpleasant atmosphere time passes slowly.”
K04 In the presence of others time passes slowly. “In the presence of others time seems expanded”
K05 In the presence of others time passes quickly. “Time passes more quickly when I am with others”
K06 In the presence of others the passage of time normalizes/feels
more pleasant/is experienced more strongly.
“In the presence of others my sense of time normalizes.”
K07 Neither situations nor the presence of others influences the
passage of time.
“While depressed, situations are not relevant for the passage of time.”
K08 The passage of time is meaningless/cannot be felt/sensed. “The passage of time is meaningless.”
K09 The passage of time is unstoppable/endless/extended/a
standstill.
“I get the feeling that I have to [act] against time.”; “Time is a merciless passage.”;
“Time has stopped”
K10 Time passes quickly. “Time passes very quickly.”
K11 Time passes slowly. “Time drags.”
K12 The present is this day. “The present is the current day.”
K13 The present is now. “The present is the moment I am living in.”
K14 The present is associated with negative feelings. “The present is evil and full of sorrow.”
K15 The present is the current activity. “The present is while I say: ‘I am doing this or that’.”
K16 The present is not extended in time. “The present seems like a point in time.”
K17 The present is extended in time. “The present to me is an extended period in time.”
K18 The present cannot be influenced. “The present is a burden because I am unable to act.”
K19 The present has to be utilized. “The present is very important. What I enjoy I can take into the future.”
K20 The present is meaningless. “Right now, the present is of lesser importance.”
K21 The past is felt with feeling of guilt. The past has a negative
influence on the present.
“I live in the present. I constantly feel guilty for mistakes I have made in the past.”
K22 The past is over and unchangeable. “The past to me is final, unchangeable.”
K23 The past has to be accepted. “I try to forget the bad things from my past.”
K24 The past shapes an individual. “I can use the past to learn.”
K25 The future is associated with fear, sorrow, and hopelessness. “Anxiety concerning the future is common.”
K26 The future is blocked. “Thinking about the future is difficult. It seems disconnected from the present
moment.”
K27 The future is uncertain. “The future is the great unknown.”
K28 The future may be influenced. “The future is everything I have influence on right now.”
K29 The future is experienced with hope. “The future is time of health, and I hope I will live to see it.”
K30 Rest. “Little time produces stress.”
FIGURE 2 | Category Count.
statements, app. 9% of all statements), associated either with
acceleration (category 10, n = 7 statements, 28% of participants)
or a deceleration (category 11, n = 15 statements, 60% of
participants). In the acceleration group 5/7 participants stated
this to be generally the case, and one found it to be distinctive
for his/her depressive episode. In the decrease group 8/15
participants stated a general deceleration, and seven found it to
be specific to their depressive episode. Most participants reported
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either an increase or a decrease in velocity corresponding to the
onset of the current depressive episode; however, two participants
gave statements revealing both an increase and a decrease since
exacerbation, with one stating the increase to occur in retrospect.
Three categories described changes in the passage of time non-
related or not specifically related to velocity (categories 06, 08,
09; in total: n = 20 statements, app. 8.5% of all statements).
Participants reported a normalization or improvement of the
experience of passage of time while being engaged in social
or pleasant activities (category 06, n = 6 statements, 24% of
participants). The same number of participants reported an
inability to feel, perceive or give meaning to the passage of time
(category 08, n = 5 statements, 20% of participants). Relatedly,
participants further stated the experience of the passage of
time being inexorable, endless, circular or a standstill (category
09, n = 9 statements, 36% of participants). Additionally and
in contrast to various statements mentioned before, several
depressed participants reported the absence of situational
influence on the passage of time (category 07, n = 9 statements,
36% of participants).
Category Group “Present”
Concerning the Experience of the Present, several categories
described the present as enduring (categories 12, 15, 17; in total
n = 19 statements, 8% of all statements). Several participants
stated that the present was experienced as extended (category
17, n = 10 statements, 40% of participants). Correspondingly
participants gave account of the present being a current activity
(category 15, n = 6, 24% of participants) or being contained
within 1 day (category 12, n= 3 statements, 12% of participants).
Concordantly, participants described the present taking place as a
conscious„ now” or within a current moment (category 13, n= 7
statements, 28% of participants). Strikingly, a significant number
of participants experienced the present as a point in time instead
of an extended duration (category 16, n = 10 statements, 40%
of participants). One category of statements concluded that the
present could be influenced (category 19, n = 7 statements, 28%
of participants), however the identical number of participants
judged the present to be out of their own control (category
18, n = 7 statements, 24% of participants). Nine participants
judged the present to be related to negative emotions (category
14, n = 9 statements, 36% of participants), and the present to be
meaningless (category 20, n= 5 statements, 20% of participants).
Category Group “Past”
Within the group concerning the Experience of the Past
participants stated that the past had a negative effect on the
present and/or was dominated by feelings of guilt (category
21, n = 15 statements, 60% of participants). Additionally,
participants experienced the past as over and unchangeable
(category 22, n = 10 statements, 40% of participants) and that
the past had to be accepted (category 23, n= 3 statements, 12% of
participants). Ten participants stated that the past had influenced
and shaped their personality or that it could be learned from
(category 24, n= 10 statements, 40% of participants).
Category Group “Future”
Within the group Experience of the Future statements describing
the future as being related to negative emotions such as
fear, worry, and hopelessness were identified most frequently
(category 25, n = 10 statements, 40% of participants).
Surprisingly, the same number of participants referred to the
future as being related to thoughts of hope (category 29,
n= 10 statements, 40% of participants). Slightly fewer statements
referred to a diminished, blocked future, meaningless, and
no longer part of subjective experience (category 26, n = 8
statements, 32% of participants), or uncertain, non-projectable,
and out of one’s own control (category 27, n= 7 statements, 28%
of participants).
DISCUSSION
The results obtained from content analysis confirmed the
very few retrospective studies (Stanghellini et al., 2016, 2017),
case reports and theoretical accounts of a disturbance of the
experience of time in MDD. Whereas the overall nature of a
fluent and variable passage of time seemed to be intact with
acceleration in pleasant and deceleration in unpleasant situations
(Vogel et al., in revision), depressed patients showed general
changes in their experience of the passage of time. The most
common was that of time having slowed down, most reliably
found experiential disturbance in MDD within the literature
(Thönes and Oberfeld, 2015).
Seemingly contradicting, we also found statements on an
increase in the experienced velocity of the passage of time.
Although we cannot rule out completely hypomanic or manic
experiences, an involvement of corresponding symptoms seems
to be highly unlikely, as pre-inclusion diagnostic procedures
were conducted rigorously according to clinical guidelines, and
all participants showed clear depressive symptoms in a clinical
range as additionally assessed by BDI. We therefore speculate
that this apparent increase may be due to one or more out of
three conceivable associations. First, stands the possibility of a
retrospective judgement of the duration of the past course of
the depressive episode—a phenomenon found within the data
and which would be describable by the so called time paradox
(Wittmann, 2016, also see Straus, 1928). According to this
phenomenon, uneventful durations (in this case the depressive
episode) retrospectively are judged to have been shorter than real
time or the contained time seemed to have gone by more quickly
than real time.
Second, clinical improvements of participants after having
started treatment may explain statements of an increase in the
overall speed of the flow of time. The ostensible discrepancy in
patient reports possibly and in part may have been influenced by
the heterogeneous treatment regimen found in our patient group.
Furthermore, it has recently been shown, that the experience of
time passing quickly can be found in healthy individuals (Vogel
et al., in revision). In other words, the increase in the velocity of
the passage of time would not appear to be a distinct feature to
MDD but in our case more closely reflected decreasing symptom
severity.
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Third, may stand a discrepancy between the description
of internal time/ego-time and external time/world-time (Straus,
1928; Lehmann, 1967; Minkowski, 1971) or intersubjective time
(Fuchs, 2013), with some subjects describing their own passage of
time as slowed down, and fewer subjects describing the external
world time as moving faster and passing by. Concordantly, our
finding of both an increase and a decrease in time in MDD may
effectively describe the same phenomenon from two different
points of view (internal vs. external). As a speculation, this
findingmay describe two psychopathological subgroups ofMDD,
with one group comparing external time to internal time (e.g.,
“everyone is passing me by”), causing the velocity of the flow of
time to be described as increased, or comparing internal time to
external time (e.g., “I am slower than everyone else”), causing
the velocity of the flow of time to be described as decreased. In
a simpler line of reasoning the differing reports on the velocity
of the flow of time, may psychopathologically delineate MDD
subgroups with decreasing velocity being the well-known more
prevalent phenomenon and an increase in velocity posing a
newly described symptom, specific to a subordinate division of
depressive disorder.
When focusing on the aspect of context-dependency of the
passage of time we find a discrepancy between the number
of statements stating that the passage of time will speed up
when engaged in a pleasant activity or situation and that it
will slow down when engaged in an unpleasant activity or
situation. Although our method is not entirely suitable for
quantitative evaluation, it relates to a somewhat similar finding,
which has very recently been reported in the judgement of the
velocity of the experience of time in an Experience Sampling
Method (Dupuy, 2017). The authors were unable to find a
significant reduction in the subjective speed of time in unpleasant
situations in participants with MDD. We argue that it seems
likely that an individual in a depressed state will not report any
further deceleration in the velocity of the passage of time in an
unpleasant situation due to the overarching unpleasantness of
the depressed state and the related deceleration of the passage of
time.
Regarding intersubjective and social aspects of time
experience our results are heterogeneous. We speculate
that an increase in the velocity of the passage of time in the
presence of others, just as the reported normalization of its
experience relative to situation, reflects that social interactions
are usually experienced as pleasant and engaging, therefore
related to an improvement in affect or mood, which in turn
causes the passage of time to be experienced as moving faster
(Vogel et al., in revision). It is important to note that our method
of qualitative inquiry into inner experience is insufficient to
provide proof of implicit interpersonal aspects of time experience
and temporal desynchronization, which have previously been
convincingly conceptualized as a possible underlying mechanism
of disturbances in time experience in depressive disorders
(Fuchs, 2001, 2005, 2013; Ratcliffe, 2012).
Concerning what has been referred to as the experience of the
structure of time (i.e., past, present, and future) (Kupke, 2009;
Vogel et al., in revision), we—similarly to the passage of time—
find an overall conserved nature of experience of time structure,
with the notion of an experience of time advancing from the past,
through the present, into the future. As previously observed in
healthy individuals (Vogel et al., in revision), and as opposed
to persons suffering from schizophrenia (Vogeley and Kupke,
2006; Stanghellini et al., 2016), participants with MDD seem to
retain this structured directedness of time from the past to the
future. In this context, both depressed and healthy individuals
experience their lives in the present, where it may be possible
to influence the future through a present activity drawing from
previously acquired knowledge and past experiences. However,
several distinct features arise from our analysis. It can be
concluded that depressed participants experience a diminished
ability to influence the present and the future. It seems as if they
feel detached from the otherwise intact structured directedness
of time. Time seems unchangeable, and the present is reduced
to circling (daily) repetition. It can further be shown that the
present and the past are strongly experienced as negative and
in the former case as meaningless. Our participants experienced
the past as a source of guilt and as providing the reasons for
one’s present suffering. The future was experienced as blocked; to
our participants it seemed out of reach and meaningless. Both
the experience of the future being uncertain and of the future
being experienced as frightening seemedmuchmore pronounced
than previously observable in healthy individuals (Vogel et al., in
revision). Both experiences of uncertainty and fear carried with
them additional feelings of hopelessness and inevitability. These
findings are in good concordance with theoretical considerations
on the psychopathology of time in depression. The above
mentioned disturbance of lived time has also been referred to
as blocked future (Straus, 1928; von Gebsattel, 1928; Fuchs,
2001; Wyllie, 2005; Stanghellini et al., 2017), disturbance of
(vital) becoming (Straus, 1928; von Gebsattel, 1954; Minkowski,
1971; Fuchs, 2013), disturbance of protention (Binswanger, 1960),
or disorder/disturbance of conation (Stanghellini et al., 2017).
In simple terms, this terminology describes the depressed
patient’s inability to advance into the future through goal
directed or planned action. This subsequently renders the
future inaccessible, turning the past into the dominant temporal
domain. Subsequently, past experiences are deemed responsible
for the depressed present state. Statements within our data
conveying an experience of a decreased or diminished ability
to influence the present and the future, an experience of an
intangible future further foregrounded by a slowed down, halted
or endless passage of time, and the addition of feelings of guilt and
negativity to an otherwise still influential past, highly correlate
with the hypothesized disorder of lived time. Although it was
not possible to draw conclusions as to the dynamic of the onset
and interrelationship of depressive symptoms of time experience
from our data, we conclude that the experience we captured by
employing the presented method, empirically validates MDD as
a disorder of lived time, including its correlating symptoms.
Our findings coincide with conclusions from a study by
Stanghellini et al. (2017) on the Abnormal Time Experience
(ATE) in MDD. The study found three changes in temporal
experience, namely (1) a standstill of bodily functions (“vital
retardation”), (2) a present and future dominated by the past,
and (3) a slowing or blocking of the flow of time (“slackening
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of the flow of time”). The second category roughly corresponds
to statements of guilt and the negative influence of the past.
The third category corresponds to statements on the decrease
in velocity of the passage of time, the standstill and endlessness
of the passage of time. However, we were unable to detect
statements referring to the first category of ATE. This is most
likely due to the fact pointed out by Stanghellini et al. (2017) that
this category refers to more implicit changes of time experience.
Hence, it will most likely not be detectable with a questionnaire
explicitly inquiring the experience of time.
Observations and analyses leave us with a coherent account
of disturbed time experience in MDD. As clearly represented
in Table 4, participants with MDD experience an inability or
difficulty to influence or advance from a meaningless and
unpleasant present. Their future seems blocked and the past
overwhelmingly negative. These phenomena present themselves
to the depressed individual before the unaffected background of a
concept of time, meaning that time not only keeps its structured
directedness, but for the individual suffering from MDD the
basic notion of how time was experienced before the onset of
depression is preserved during illness. This background may
arise from implicit intersubjective aspects of temporality, and be
the distinguishing origin of depressive suffering (Ratcliffe, 2012;
Fuchs, 2013).
The syndrome of disturbed lived time in MDD emerging
from our analysis suggests a variety of implications for further
research with both phenomenological and cognitive neuro-
scientific approaches. The relationship between the inseparable
formats of time experience—passage of time and structure
of time—remains largely uninvestigated in phenomenological,
cognitive and in neuroscientific research. The syndrome of a
disturbed lived time in MDD demonstrates convincingly the
intricate relationship of the passage or flow of time and the
structure of time. Neither the experience of the passage of
time, nor the experience of the dimensions of time, i.e., past,
present, and future, are clearly separable. They interpenetrate and
influence each other in a dynamic, complex and “dialectic” way,
creating what we refer to as structured directedness.
We speculate that changes in the experience and judgment
of the subjective flow of time reflect an individual’s present
state of becoming, i.e., the congruence of the present activity or
state and a desired state. Thus, an individual will experience an
unpleasant deceleration in the flow of time during an unpleasant
or non-engaging activity (Zakay, 2014), or an acceleration in the
flow of time or pleasant fading out of the experience of time
(e.g., Csikszentmihályi, 1990; Hancock andWeaver, 2005) during
pleasant or engaging activities. The samemay rule true formental
disorders and especially affective disorders. Inversely, it has been
discussed that the experience of the velocity of the passage of time
may be causative to a pleasant or unpleasant experience during
a specific activity (Sackett et al., 2010); transcribed to MDD this
would suggest that a decrease in the velocity of the passage of time
is causative to depressed mood. In either case it seems plausible
that the mechanism behind time experience serves as a specific
indicator for the current state of what has been referred to as an
individual’s becoming (Minkowski, 1923, 1971; Straus, 1928; von
Gebsattel, 1954; Fuchs, 2013), and that experiences of velocity
changes are an integral component of the disturbance of lived
time in MDD (Straus, 1928). Relatedly, the subjective speed of
time passage has been put forward as reflective of overall status
of health (Droit-Volet, 2013; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2016).
It has recently been proposed that the repeated findings
of a subjectively slowed down flow of time in MDD, when
contrasted with the heterogeneous findings from time perception
research in depressive disorders, in addition to other diverging
results between subjective time experience and timing, may be
due to two separate underlying mechanisms (Droit-Volet, 2013;
Lamotte et al., 2014; Droit-Volet and Wearden, 2016). The
mechanism for time perception being the heavily investigated
internal clock (Church, 1984; Droit-Volet, 2013; Shi et al., 2013;
Allman et al., 2014), and the mechanism for time experience still
remaining unclear, although introspection has been suggested as
a possible underlying process (Fayolle et al., 2013; Lamotte et al.,
2014). These disturbances of subjective time experience have
been associated with impaired decision-making (Wittmann and
Paulus, 2008;Woods et al., 2014; Owen et al., 2015). Additionally,
a slowed down subjective flow of time has been conceptualized
to be linked to psychomotor retardation in MDD (Kitamura and
Kumar, 1982; Blewet, 1992; Bschor et al., 2004; Gil and Droit-
Volet, 2009; Stanghellini et al., 2017), although diverging findings
exist (Bech, 1975).
As changes in the brain’s resting state (Kaiser et al., 2015;
Drysdale et al., 2017) have been implicated as possible underlying
neuropathophysiology in MDD, it has been speculated,
that phenomenological (spatio-)temporal abnormalities and
(spatio-)temporal abnormalities observed through neuroimaging
in psychiatric conditions including MDD may be corresponding
phenomena (Northoff, 2016a,b; Northoff and Stanghellini,
TABLE 4 | Disturbance of Lived Time in depression.
Symptom Definition Relating categories
Slowed/halted flow of time. The passage of time feels unpleasant; time seems to have slowed down or stopped; the patient has
to struggle against time and its flow.
K07, K08, K09, K11, K20
Meaningless present. The present holds no significance; it cannot be influenced sufficiently; it seems endless or circular. K09, K14, K19, K20
Overwhelmingly negative past. The past’s influence is exceedingly negative; feelings and thoughts of guilt and sorrow dominate;
former misdoings cannot be redeemed.
K21, K22, K23, K26
Blocked future. The patient feels stuck in depressive suffering; change and advances are not possible; the future is
meaningless and hopeless.
K09, K21, K25, K26
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2016). We argue that in the case of MDD, the psychopathological
specifiers lie in the disturbance of lived time.
In a differing context resting state data has provided results
for further differentiation of subtypes in MDD (Drysdale et al.,
2017; Price et al., 2017) and in line with current opinion
we suggest that psychopathology may offer a complementary
approach to neuroscientific proceedings in identifying secondary
types or specifiers of MDD and vice versa (Sullivan et al., 2002;
Fountoulakis et al., 2004; Stanghellini and Rossi, 2014; Owen
et al., 2015; Stanghellini and Aragona, 2016). In accordance
with our findings, we suggest a possible subgroup distinction
may lie in reports of experiences of an increase and a decrease
in the velocity of the flow of time. As specified above,
accounts of a slow flow of time may be specific to more
severe depressed states and those about fast flow of time
may either reflect recovery from depression, hence possibly
posing a specific symptom to less severe depressive episodes,
or it may in fact be a distinctive feature to a previously
unidentified clinical subtype of MDD. Unfortunately, due to
the limitations of qualitative analysis - specifically vulnerability
to false negatives, possible oversimplification, and the only
partially quantitative assessment of categories—, it is not feasible
to search for the assumed correlations between the occurring
symptoms of disturbances in subjective time and e.g. overall
depressive symptom severity on the basis of our data. Although
we consider the sample size saturated, fully adequate and
sufficient for our qualitative assessment (Sandelowski, 1995;
Pope et al., 2000; Mason, 2010; Glaser and Strauss, 2017), it is
too small to search for discrete subtypes within the identified
syndrome, as the qualitative method is not intended for this
type of statistical investigation (Brown and Lloyd, 2001). Further
integrative research approaches will be necessary to properly
examine the possibility of distinct depression subtypes within the
corresponding disorder of subjective time experience.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Using a time questionnaire (TQ) specifically designed for the
investigation of time experience, we acquired qualitative material
from 25 participants suffering from MDD. Although patients
were recruited after a rigorous diagnostic process, we did not
administer psychometric procedures after inclusion and the
treatment regimen was relatively heterogenic. This possibly may
have interfered with patients’ self-reports. These limitations
of our study are accompanied by general methodological
limitations of content analysis, primarily vulnerability to false
negatives, possible oversimplification, and the only partially
quantitative assessment of categories. Despite these restrictions,
we were able to identify a specific disturbance of lived
time and corresponding clinical symptoms in MDD. These
findings hold several implications. As disturbances in time
experience in MDD have been repeatedly described in previous
literature, but as of yet have not been included as diagnostic
criteria, the detailed description of an underlying syndrome
provided herein, might facilitate additional diagnostic accuracy.
Moreover, our findings suggest a probable specification of MDD
subgroups based on the disturbance of lived time, be it between
degrees of severity or genuinely distinct depressive syndromes.
Further research will be needed to investigate the implications
posed by a syndrome of disturbed time experience in MDD.
We suggest that integrative research designs combining both
psychopathological and neuroscientific methods will provide
the most fruitful approach to the further investigation of time
experience.
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